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Cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies represents a most intriguing
puzzle to scientists in various disciplines. Here we present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting coopera-
tion under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension
leads to rock–scissors–paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies cooperate, defect and loner i.e. those
unwilling to participate in the public enterprise. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice this
results in interesting dynamical properties and intriguing spatio-temporal patterns. In particular, variations of
the value of the public good leads to transitions between one-, two- and three-strategy states which are either in
the class of directed percolation or show interesting analogies to Ising-type models. Although volunteering is
incapable of stabilizing cooperation, it efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish behavior and enables
cooperators to persist at substantial levels.
PACS numbers: 05.50.+q, 87.23.Cc
In behavioral sciences and more recently in economics the
evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals repre-
sents one of the most stunning phenomena [1, 2]. The pris-
oner’s dilemma (PD) has long established as a paradigm to ex-
plain cooperative behavior through pairwise interactions [3].
While the PD attracted attention from biologists and social
scientists, most studies in experimental economics focused on
the closely related but more general public goods game (PGG)
for group interactions [4]. In typical PGG experiments, an
experimenter endows e.g. four players with $ 10 each. The
players then have the opportunity to invest part or all of their
money into a common pool. They know that the total amount
in the pool is doubled and equally divided among all partici-
pants irrespective of their contributions. If everybody cooper-
ates and contributes their money, each player ends up with $
20. However, every player faces the temptation to defect and
to free-ride on the other player’s contributions by withholding
the money since every invested dollar returns only 50 cents to
the investor. Obviously, defection represents the dominating
strategy leading to the ’rational’ equilibrium where no one in-
creases its initial capital. Such strategical behavior prescribed
to homo oeconomicus is frequently at odds with experimental
findings [5] and lead to the decline of this rationality concept.
Note that for pairwise encounters with a fixed investment
amount, the PGG reduces to the PD. PGG interactions are
abundant in animal and human societies [6, 7, 8]. Consider for
example predator inspection behavior, alarm calls and group
defense as well as health insurance, public transportation or
environmental issues, to name only a few.
Recently it was demonstrated that voluntary participation
in such public enterprises may provide an escape hatch out of
economic stalemate and results in a substantial and persistent
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willingness to cooperate even in sizable groups, in absence of
repeated interactions, under full anonymity and without sec-
ondary mechanisms such as punishment or reward [9].
The voluntary participation in the PGG is modeled by con-
sidering three strategical types of players: (i) cooperators C
and (ii) defectors D both willing to join the PGG, with dif-
ferent intentions though. While the former are ready to con-
tribute a fixed share to the common pool, the latter attempt to
exploit the resource. Finally there are the so-called (iii) loners
L which refuse to participate and rather rely on some small
but fixed income. The loner strategy is thus risk averse. These
strategies lead to a rock-scissors-paper dynamics with cyclic
dominance: if cooperators abound, they can be exploited by
defectors, but if defectors prevail it is best to abstain and if
no one participates in the PGG, small groups can form and
it pays to return to cooperation. Therefore, voluntary partic-
ipation provides a simple yet natural way to avoid deadlocks
in states of mutual defection. In well-mixed populations, i.e.
in mean-field type models with replicator dynamics [10], this
system can be solved analytically [11].
In this letter, we consider a spatially extended variant of
the voluntary PGG where players are arranged on a rigid reg-
ular lattice and interact with their local neighborhood only.
Each player is confined to a site x on a square lattice. The
size of the neighborhood therefore determines the maximum
number of participants N in the PGG. We restrict our inves-
tigations to the von Neumann neighborhood, i.e. to N = 5.
But note that the qualitative results remain unaffected by the
underlying geometry of the regular lattice. The state variable
s(x)∈ {C,D,L} determines the player’s strategy at any given
time. The score achieved in PGG interactions denotes the re-
productive success, i.e. the probability that one of the neigh-
bors will adopt the player’s strategy. In the rigorous sense of
the spatial PGG, this score is accumulated overN = 5 games,
i.e. by summing up the player’s performance in PGGs taking
place on the player’s site as well as on the neighboring sites.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the score P (x) is
2determined by a single, typical PGG involving the player and
its four nearest neighbors. This simplification accelerates the
simulations and makes the pair approximation more conve-
nient while causing minor modifications in the system’s dy-
namics.
The score P (x) depends on the five strategies. Namely, if
nc, nd, and nl (with nc + nd + nl = N = 5) denote the
number of participants choosing C, D and L, then
P (x) =


rnc
nc + nd
− 1 if s(x) = C,
rnc
nc + nd
if s(x) = D,
σ if s(x) = L,
(1)
where the cooperative investments are normalized to unity and
r specifies the multiplication factor on the public good. Note
that r > 1 must hold such that groups of cooperators are bet-
ter off than groups of defectors - hence to establish a social
dilemma. The loner payoff σ with 0 < σ < r − 1 denotes
a small but reliable source of income with a lower perfor-
mance than mutual cooperation but better than mutual defec-
tion. Solitary C or D players (nc + nd = 1) are assumed to
act as loners.
Players reassessing and updating their strategies are ran-
domly chosen (e.g. at site x) and compare their score to a
randomly chosen neighbor y. x adopts the strategy of y with
a probability [12]:
W [s(y)→ s(x)] =
1
1 + exp[(P (x) − P (y) + τ)/K]
(2)
where τ > 0 denotes the cost of strategy change and K in-
troduces some noise to allow for irrational i.e. non-payoff-
maximizing choices. For K = 0 the neighboring strategy
s(y) is always adopted provided the payoff difference exceeds
the cost of strategy change, i.e. P (y) > P (x)+τ . ForK > 0,
strategies performing worse are also adopted with a certain
probability e.g. due to imperfect information. K determines
the half-width of this probability distribution.
By means of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations complemented
by pair approximation, we determine the equilibrium frequen-
cies of the three strategies when varying r while keeping σ,K
and τ fixed. For the pair approximation we determine analyt-
ically the doublet density i.e. the probability of all configu-
rations of two neighboring sites [12]. Through moment clo-
sure i.e. by approximating higher order densities (e.g. triplets)
with doublet densities, a set of equations of motion is obtained
which is solved numerically.
Qualitatively the dynamics remains unaffected when
changing σ,K and τ within realistic limits. Henceforth we
thus concentrate on the general features of spatio-temporal
patterns and transitions. As we shall see, the cyclic domi-
nance of the strategies acts as a driving force for traveling
waves and leads to persistent and robust co-existence of all
three strategies over a wide parameter range. Similar results
have been found for an externally driven variant of the spa-
tially extended PD with three strategies [13] or if sites are al-
lowed to go empty [14]. The simulations are performed un-
der periodic boundary conditions on an M ×M lattice with
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FIG. 1: Frequencies of cooperators C (open squares) and defectors D
(open diamonds) as a function of the multiplication rate r for σ = 1
and τ = K = 0.1. The solid line shows the frequency of defectors
in pair approximation. The arrow indicates rC where cooperators
vanish.
400 ≤ M ≤ 2000. In general, we choose a random initial
state and after suitable thermalization times we determine the
average frequency and fluctuation of the three strategies.
Let us first briefly consider the compulsory PGG, i.e. with
C and D only. The spatial extension may enable cooperators to
persist by forming clusters and thereby minimizing exploita-
tion by defectors. This is a well-known result from other co-
operation games [12, 15, 16]. For sufficiently high r > rC co-
operators survive with frequencies quickly increasing with r
because C is favored for an increasing number of local config-
urations. In contrast, below the threshold rC the system even-
tually reaches the homogeneous D state (see Fig. 1). Hence-
forth, the subscript α of rα refers to the vanishing strategy.
In the close vicinity of rC, the visualization of strategy dis-
tribution shows isolated colonies of C. These colonies move
randomly and can coalesce or divide. Consequently, this sys-
tem becomes equivalent to a branching and annihilating ran-
dom walk [17] which exhibits a transition belonging to the
directed percolation (DP) universality class [12, 18, 19, 20].
According to MC simulations for r → rC from above, the fre-
quency of C is proportional to (r − rC)β with rC = 4.526(1)
and β = 0.55(3) for σ = 1 and K = τ = 0.1. The
pair approximation predicts a significantly lower critical value
r
(p)
C = 2.694. This difference refers to the enhanced role of
n-point (n > 2) correlations. The four-point approximation is
expected to yield more accurate results [13].
In the case of voluntary participation, the loners induce sig-
nificant changes most pronounced at low r. The resulting dy-
namics can be divided into three regimes (see Fig. 2): (a) For
r < rD = 1 + σ it is trivial that only loners survive since
they perform better than groups of cooperators. Note that soli-
tary C and D are eliminated by noise. (b) For rD < r < rL
the three strategies co-exist and produce fascinating spatio-
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FIG. 2: Frequencies of cooperators C (open squares), defectors D
(open diamonds) and loners L (open triangles) as a function of r for
σ = 1 and τ = K = 0.1. The results of pair approximation are
shown as dotted (C), solid (D) and dashed (L) lines. The values of
rD and rL are indicated by arrows.
temporal patterns including traveling waves [21]. Such values
of r almost invariably result in homogeneous D states in the
compulsory PGG. Thus, the loners provide vital protection to
cooperators against exploitation. (c) For r > rL cooperators
again thrive on their own as in the compulsory PGG. Loners
go extinct because they no longer provide a valuable alterna-
tive.
In the remaining text we discuss the co-existence regime in
greater detail. According to our numerical analysis, the ex-
tinction of loners for r → rL also exhibits a DP transition
[19, 22, 23]. The frequency of L is proportional to (rL − r)β
in the vicinity of rL = 4.6005(5) with β = 0.58(3) in agree-
ment with previous data [20]. The increase of fluctuations in
the frequency of loners is consistent with a power law diver-
gence predicted by scaling hypothesis [22, 23].
The robustness of DP transitions is well demonstrated by
noting that the two critical transitions belong to the same uni-
versality class despite remarkable differences. The extinc-
tion of C, leaving a homogeneous D state behind, contrasts
with the extinction of L on a time-dependent, inhomogeneous
C+D background. Field-theoretic arguments indicate that the
main features of DP remain unchanged if the spatio-temporal
fluctuations of the random environment are uncorrelated [23].
Our numerical results support this expectation.
In the region of co-existence, the frequency of C remains
within narrow limits compared to the trends observed for D
and L. Figure 2 indicates that the pair approximation yields
a suitable quantitative description. In particular, D vanishes
linearly with r → rD. This behavior is strongly related to pat-
tern evolution observed for low D frequency (see Fig. 3). The
D strategy forms small black islands invading the territory of
C. At the same time, defectors are in turn invaded by loners
paving the way for the return of cooperators. The cyclic dom-
inance maintains this self-organizing pattern. But defectors
FIG. 3: Distribution of cooperators (white), defectors (black) and
loners (gray) on a 200× 200 portion of a larger lattice. The parame-
ters are σ = 1, τ = K = 0.1 and r = 2.035 i.e. slightly above the
transition to homogeneous states of loners.
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FIG. 4: Log-log plot of the frequency fluctuations χ vs. r−rD (sym-
bols and parameters as in Fig. 2). χ denotes the square of average
fluctuation amplitudes produced by the system of size M2. The solid
line shows the fitted power law with γ = 1.72.
can easily die out if the system size is not large enough. The
occasional extinction of D results in a homogeneous C state.
Therefore, this requires extremely large system sizes and a
careful preparation of the initial state. For example, r may be
gradually decreased until the desired value is reached, or an
artificial initial state may be prepared with neighboring strips
of D and L in a world of C. Interestingly, the fluctuations of
the D frequency remains constant while the frequency itself
vanishes linearly (see Fig. 4). Consequently, to avoid acci-
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FIG. 5: Log-log plot of the correlation length ξ vs. r − rD for the
three strategies (parameters as in Fig. 2). The solid line denotes the
fitted power law with an exponent −0.99.
dental extinctions of D, sufficiently large system sizes M are
required such that the average number of D is much larger
than the root-mean-square of their fluctuations.
The typical domain size increases when r goes to rD. Fig-
ure 4 illustrates that this is accompanied by a power law di-
vergence of the frequency fluctuations for C and L strategies
χc ≃ χl ∝ (r − rD)
−γ
. The numerical fit gives an exponent
close to γ = 7/4which is characteristic to the order parameter
fluctuations in the Ising model when approaching the critical
point from above [24]. One might argue that the multiplica-
tion factor r is related to an external field stimulating cooper-
ation and the noise term K to temperature, however, a direct
mapping seems impossible due to the additional dependence
on the loner’s payoff σ.
Another curiosity of this model refers to the equal frequen-
cies of C and L in this limit. Moreover, the correlation length
ξ (derived from the density-density correlation function, see
Fig. 5) appears to be proportional to 1/(r − rD). The for-
mation of larger and larger domains in the two-dimensional,
zero-field Ising model exhibits similar behavior when decreas-
ing the temperature to the critical point [24]. This suggests
that the universality of this Ising type transition determines
constraints on the size distributions of C and L domains. In
this case the defectors with vanishing frequency contribute to
maintain suitable domain dynamics.
To conclude, we introduced a spatial evolutionary PGG
model demonstrating that the successful spreading of self-
ish behavior is efficiently prevented by allowing for voluntary
participation. In the compulsory PGG, i.e. in absence of lon-
ers, cooperators thrive only if clustering advantages are strong
enough which requires sufficiently high multiplication factors
r. The introduction of loners leads to a cyclic dominance of
the strategies and promotes substantial levels of cooperation
where otherwise defectors dominate.
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